S. HRG. 98-263

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

HEARING

BEFORE THE

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
UNITED STATES SENATE

NINETY-EIGHTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

SEPTEMBER 21, 1983

Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Relations

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
25-249 O WASHINGTON : 1983

S381-38.

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

CHARLES H. PERCY, Illinois, *Chairman*

HOWARD H. BAKER, JR., Tennessee	CLAIBORNE PELL, Rhode Island
JESSE HELMS, North Carolina	JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., Delaware
RICHARD G. LUGAR, Indiana	JOHN GLENN, Ohio
CHARLES McC. MATHIAS, JR., Maryland	PAUL S. SARBANES, Maryland
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, Kansas	EDWARD ZORINSKY, Nebraska
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, Minnesota	PAUL E. TSONGAS, Massachusetts
LARRY PRESSLER, South Dakota	ALAN CRANSTON, California
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, Alaska	CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, Connecticut

SCOTT COHEN, *Staff Director*
GERYLD B. CHRISTIANSON, *Minority Staff Director*

CONTENTS

Hearing day: Page
September 21, 1983 1
Statements of:
Shultz, Hon. George P., Secretary of State 3
Kelley, Gen. Paul X., Commandant, U.S. Marines 9

WAR POWERS RESOLUTION

WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 21, 1983

UNITED STATES SENATE,
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
Washington, D.C.

The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 3:04 p.m., in room SD-419, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Hon. Charles H. Percy (chairman of the committee) presiding.

Present: Senators Percy, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Murkowski, Pell, Glenn, Sarbanes, and Tsongas.

The CHAIRMAN. On behalf of the committee, I warmly welcome back Secretary of State George Shultz, and we welcome here today Marine Commandant Gen. Paul X. Kelley. We are here for the purpose of discussing Lebanon. During the past several weeks, we all have participated in long discussions concerning the proper role for the United States in Lebanon.

Support by Congress for our continued assistance to the people and Government of Lebanon has been overwhelming. Our support results from several factors, including a desire to help the long-suffering Lebanese people find peace, to reassert their national sovereignty throughout Lebanon, and to arrange the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

I also believe that the restoration of a peaceful, stable Lebanon is in our own national interest. For too many years, regional and international factions have used Lebanon as a base to war on one another. These forces have also used Lebanon to attack our interests and those of our friends.

Certainly one can never forget, as I did the first time I visited Beirut, seeing the PLO camp there, and I recognized that no official of Lebanon, the government, civil, military, or police, was allowed inside that camp. It was a government within a government, and there they have the antiaircraft guns mounted right up there. They were willing to wage war, shoot, and lob missiles inside a sovereign country.

Syria has had its Armed Forces in Lebanon since 1976. If the situation in Lebanon is not stabilized, another major confrontation between Syria and Israel could well start. A sovereign Lebanon, free from foreign forces, will contribute to regional stability.

The joint resolution introduced yesterday by the majority leaders, Senator Baker and myself, and I would like also to say that Senator Pell participated late last week in some of the meetings with Senator Byrd, Senator Baker, Jim Baker from the White House, White House staff, and others. The resolution that Senator Baker and I introduced is an authorization for the continued par-

ticipation of U.S. Armed Forces in a current multinational force for up to 18 additional months. It is identical to one introduced by House Speaker O'Neill and Chairman Zablocki, and was worked out in discussion with White House officials during the past week.

The President has announce that he would sign it in its present form. The committee will want to consider the merits of this approach as well as the resolutions authored by Senator Mathias and Minority Leader Senator Byrd prior to our markup session.

I have also asked former Senator Javits, the principal Senator author of the War Powers Resolution, to make his thoughts available. I have discussed it with him this morning, and he will have a memorandum to us by Thursday giving us his views, though we have exchanged views on the telephone a number of times.

I would like to announce for the benefit of the committee that we will have a meeting in this room. We are changing the procedure we announced previously, that we would be in markup on Tuesday. The House would like the Senate to act first, and I notified Senator Baker yesterday that I felt it proper that the Senate act first in this matter.

We therefore would have a markup session beginning at 9 a.m. on Friday morning of this week, and without objection, we will have a final vote on resolutions, and they will be offered then in sequence of their having been offered, a vote on all three resolutions or whatever resolutions have been introduced at that time in sequence, beginning at 12 noon.

Mr. Secretary, you have appeared here today on very short notice. You had a session with the House. I know that several Senators, including me, must go to the White House at 4:10. I would hope that we could finish by roughly 4 o'clock, if at all possible. If not, I would hope, Senator Lugar, that you, or whichever ranking member is here, would please assume the chair.

We welcome you warmly, Mr. Secretary and General.

Senator Pell, do you have any comments?

Senator PELL. Mr. Chairman, this hearing is of vital importance. We are concerned with a momentous issue of war and peace in Lebanon and how we can support a stable, sovereign country that is free of foreign forces. For many hundreds of years, Christians, Maronite Christians, and Moslems have been fighting each other, and for a few years between the two world wars a fragile peace was there. This fragile peace fell apart following intervention in that country, and we now have a very rough and difficult situation.

Four marines—our own marines—have already been killed, and several dozen have been wounded. For the first time since World War II, American ships have shelled land in the Mediterranean waters. The United States has expressed its intention to defend its marines and the Lebanese Army in and around the strategic mountain village of Suq al-Gharb. Meanwhile, war rages in the mountains southeast of Beirut. Tensions continue to mount in Beirut, and terrorist attacks continue unabated in Tripoli in the north and Sidon in the south.

Syria has announced, too, that if the American naval shelling continues, it will attack our own ships off the coast.

It is in this context that a compromise has apparently been struck between the White House and some of the congressional

leadership over the war powers and our involvement in Lebanon, but I am frank to admit that I am troubled by some aspects of the compromise resolution.

Some questions remain unanswered, such as, does the congressional authorization extend to offshore forces as well as to the marines on the ground? How does the finding, as in the Baker resolution, that our forces are now in hostilities square with the bilateral agreement between the United States and Lebanon that the multinational force would not serve in a combat role?

And, finally, and this, I think, is a key question, is 18 months too long an authorization when one considers the volatility of the Lebanese situation, the uncertainties as to our purposes and goals in Lebanon, and the legitimate concern of the American public that our Marines not die in someone else's war?

I hope that we can get answers to these questions during the course of this hearing, and look forward to the Secretary's testimony.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much, Senator Pell.

I would like to add for the benefit of the committee and for the administration's advice also that arrangements have been made with Senator Baker so that we will file our report after our vote at 12 noon on Friday. The report will be available on the Senate floor then, so that this can be and will be by law the privileged business.

We will have to set aside whatever we are doing, including the State Department authorization bill, unless we get that finished this week.

The debate is limited to a maximum, a maximum of 3 days. The majority leader has agreed that Monday we will begin the debate, and there will be no votes on Monday. We can hopefully finish up on Tuesday, but by the deadline Wednesday, we would have to finish the bill, vote on it, and send it to the House, where our bill becomes the privileged legislation that must be considered, all things set aside. I hope it is not the State Department authorization bill again, but all things must be set aside for their 3 days of debate.

Secretary Shultz, we welcome you.

STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE P. SHULTZ, SECRETARY OF STATE

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and distinguished members of the committee. I appreciate the opportunity to come here to talk with you about Lebanon, about our policy there, and about the importance of cooperation between our two branches of Government as we pursue our objectives there.

The issues in Lebanon are not partisan issues. At stake are goals and principles of American foreign policy on which I believe there is in fact a considerable measure of consensus. There may be legitimate differences over tactics or prerogatives, but the achievement of our national objectives is clearly impaired if the President and the Congress attempt to conduct two different foreign policies.

We must work together to meet our common national responsibility, or else our common national interest in the world will suffer.

In the last 15 years, there have been serious instances of deadlock between our two branches of Government which resulted in harm to our foreign policy and human tragedy. President Reagan is determined that this will not be such a case. It is in this spirit that we have approached this problem, and we are heartened by the similar spirit we have seen in the Congress.

Let me say a few words about our policy in the Middle East and in Lebanon, what we are attempting to accomplish there, and why the presence of our Marines has been of enormous importance.

In the nearly 10 years since the October 1973 war, the United States has been vigorously and almost continuously engaged in Middle East diplomacy. This Nation has a strong moral and political commitment to Israel, and we have many strong friendships in the Arab world. Therefore, we have always understood that a negotiated solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict was in the national interest of the United States.

Israel and its Arab neighbors deserve to live in peace and security. The Palestinian people deserve a just solution to their legitimate rights and aspirations. All the nations of the region deserve a future free of external intervention and superpower confrontation.

We have no illusions about the difficulty of achieving these goals, but the American people can be proud of the role that our country has played in bringing about progress toward peace in the past 10 years. Just over 1 year ago, President Reagan addressed himself to the broader questions of Middle East peace in a major initiative which offered and still offers the most practical, and workable, and hopeful basis for negotiation.

Anyone in the Middle East who truly seeks a just, secure, and comprehensive solution to the conflict will have to turn in the direction of the President's initiative, firmly grounded, as it is, in the Camp David Accords and U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

The crisis in Lebanon cannot be isolated from the larger Middle East crisis. It involves many of the same parties concerned with the broader issues of Middle East peace. It involves similar questions of security, respect for sovereignty, and peaceful settlement of disputes. Progress toward a peaceful solution in Lebanon will contribute to the broader peace process. Setbacks in Lebanon will make the broader effort that much harder.

From the beginning, we have had essentially three policy objectives in Lebanon, the withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon, a sovereign, independent Lebanon dedicated to national unity, and able to exercise its authority throughout its national territory, and security for Israel's northern border, so that the inhabitants of northern Israel can live in safety and without fear of artillery and rocket attacks.

The latest outbreak of fighting should not cause us to lose sight of these objectives, which are and have been a constant of our policy. These objectives are also complementary.

Lebanon is a proud and beautiful country whose people have contributed much to the world, yet it has also had a complex and turbulent history. The roots of enmity in that country go very deep indeed. Nevertheless, for many years, Lebanon thrived because po-

litical rivalries were accommodated and a delicate balance maintained.

Our country, too, suffered a tragic civil war, but we survived and overcame it. The people of Lebanon remember a happier time, when their nation was a dynamic, progressive, and prosperous democracy. The yearning for peace, too, runs deep in Lebanon. When the terrible ordeal of Beirut ended last summer, and President Amin Gemayel was elected shortly thereafter, it appeared that Lebanon would get a second chance after all.

Most of Lebanon's many confessional groups pledged their loyalty to the new leader, and seemed ready to bury their differences in the name of political and economic renewal. Postwar economic reconstruction seemed well under way. Public confidence was returning. The Government of Lebanon concluded that the withdrawal of all non-Lebanese armed forces from its soil was a matter of top priority.

Whatever indigenous obstacles to national reconciliation the Lebanese may face, and however prepared they may be to overcome them if given a chance, that process can never really get underway so long as Lebanon remains occupied by foreign armies, foreign paramilitary forces, and foreign terrorist groups.

The United States therefore responded favorably to the request of the Lebanese Government and the urging of many of our Arab friends to help Lebanon and Israel reach an agreement that would be a first step toward the withdrawal of external forces. Israel was prepared to withdraw, and Lebanon was willing to negotiate an agreement that also met Israel's legitimate need for security on its northern border.

After lengthy negotiations, and with a great deal of good will on both sides, Lebanon and Israel reached such an agreement on May 17. The United States also put its weight behind President Gemayel's efforts for political accommodation among Lebanon's confessional groups.

Three weeks ago, on August 31, President Gemayel, with his council of ministers, called upon key Lebanese leaders to join in a dialog on a new national approach to reconciliation and unity. He has made clear his willingness to broaden the base and composition of his government to reflect a true sharing of power. This is a policy we have strongly urged, supported, and assisted, and we have no doubt of President Gemayel's sincerity.

President Reagan's envoys, Ambassadors Robert McFarlane and Richard Fairbanks, have devoted considerable time and effort to this enterprise, as has the Government of Saudi Arabia. The problem, of course, has been Syria. Our policy and that of Lebanon has had two tracks, foreign troop withdrawal and national reconciliation.

Both these tracks have been blocked by Syria, which has been heavily rearmed by the Soviet Union since last summer. No one questions Syria's legitimate security concerns with respect to Lebanon, but Syria, unlike Israel, has been unwilling to negotiate with Lebanon over how to reconcile its security concerns with Lebanon's sovereign right to follow its own path.

The question arises whether Syria's aim is to assure its security or to assure its domination of Lebanon. Consider Syria now has the

largest army in Lebanon, but it has refused to negotiate the withdrawal of its forces, reneging on repeated pledges that it would do so once the Israelis did. Syria has persisted in this course even in defiance of the Lebanese Government's formal request at the beginning of September to Syria, the PLO, and the Arab League that all external forces withdraw.

Israel has stated its unwillingness to withdraw totally as long as Syrian forces are there. Thus, Syria is in the ironic position of keeping Israeli forces in Lebanon. Syria is also permitting the reentry of armed Palestinian groups into the Aleyh/Shuf area, in violation of the agreement reached through Ambassador Habib's mediation last year.

At the same time, Syria is using its leverage within Lebanon to obstruct the process of national reconciliation. Indeed, Syria has instigated an organized political opposition within Lebanon, and has armed several factions engaged in military actions against the legitimate government.

The immediate focus of our diplomacy is a cease-fire between the various groups fighting in Lebanon. Saudi Arabia has been actively pursuing the same goal. Jordan, Egypt, and other friendly Arab countries have been very supportive of these diplomatic efforts. The outcome of this negotiation, as of any negotiation, will depend on the balance of forces. Those who seek to improve their position by force of arms will probably not agree to a cease-fire until they run up against a stalemate on the battlefield.

This brings me to the military situation. A year ago President Reagan dispatched 1,200 U.S. marines to Lebanon to participate in the multinational force that was requested by that country's Government. The presence of this force was designed to help restore that Government's sovereignty and authority. It was also intended to further that Government's efforts to assure the safety of people in the area and to end the violence that has tragically recurred in the massacres of Sabra and Shatila.

British, French, and Italian forces are serving alongside our Marines, and thus the MNF is truly a multilateral cooperative effort. Its task is a peacekeeping mission, not a war fighting mission. Its job is not to take sides in the war, but on the contrary, to help provide a sense of security that will help the legitimate Government of Lebanon pursue its goals of national sovereignty, unity, and independence.

Most of the key congessional groups and friendly Arab countries supported this role for the MNF when it was sent to Lebanon, and they continue to support this role. Now, the MNF is under challenge by those apparently determined to prevent an internal political accommodation. The President has augmented U.S. naval support forces offshore, and has authorized U.S. forces to exercise their right of self-defense should attacks on them continue.

Our MNF partners have taken similar or other measures to assure security and self-defense. We are concerned about recent attacks on key strategic positions in the vicinity of Beirut which are vital to the safety of our Marines, of other American military and diplomatic personnel, and to the security of Beirut itself.

We have responded to these attacks in order to defend our people, and will continue to do so. General Kelley will be able to

answer questions you may have about the military situation. As I have suggested, a cease-fire will come about only when all parties conclude it is in their interest. Our strategy in Lebanon is to help create conditions that will make it in everyone's interest. Our objective is to help produce a kind of equilibrium which will encourage a cease-fire, political accommodation, and ultimately the withdrawal of all foreign forces.

We are seeking to build a structure of stability on the following pillars. The first component of our strategy is political negotiations to bring about national reconciliation within Lebanon, to ease or resolve the internal rivalries and mutual suspicions that are at the heart of Lebanon's agony. We have strongly supported this endeavor. We are also concerned for the safety of the Palestinian civilians in Lebanon.

The second element is diplomacy to mobilize international support for the legitimate Government of Lebanon, for its efforts at reconciliation, and for its cease fire. The United States is actively engaged in this effort. In the military dimension, the primary responsibility rests on the Lebanese Armed Forces, which have performed with remarkable skill and courage in difficult circumstances. We have helped train and equip these forces, and we are pleased that these forces have been reconstituted to take into account the confessional balance in Lebanon.

An army that would be more than adequate for its mission of keeping order once foreign forces were removed, however, is now understandably under severe pressures, because it is under assault by forces protected, armed, and encouraged by Syria. There are also armed Palestinian groups, as I noted. It is the external, non-Lebanese involvement that enormously compounds the problem.

Israel continues to have influence with many groups in Lebanon, and has an interest in encouraging national reconciliation and stability. Events north of the Awwali River must be of concern to Israel, since its long-term security cannot but be affected by Syrian and PLO dominance of the rest of Lebanon.

The MNF, including our marines, provide an added measure of stability in the overall equation, as I have described. It is not the mission of our marines or of the MNF as a whole to maintain the military balance in Lebanon by themselves. Nevertheless, their presence remains one crucial pillar of the structure of stability. They are an important deterrent, a symbol of the international backing behind the legitimate Government of Lebanon, and an important weight in the scales.

To remove the marines would put both the Government and what we are trying to achieve in jeopardy. This is why our domestic controversy over war powers has been so disturbing. Uncertainty about the American commitment can only weaken our effectiveness. Doubts about our staying power can only cause potential aggressors to discount our presence or to intensify their attacks in hopes of hastening our departure.

An accommodation between the President and Congress to resolve this dispute will help dispell those doubts about our staying power, and strengthen our hand.

As this committee is well aware, the executive and legislative branches have had important differences of principle with respect

to the War Powers Resolution. The executive branch has traditionally had questions about the requirement of congressional authorization for Presidential disposition of our Armed Forces, both in light of the President's Commander in Chief power and on practical grounds.

Congress, of course, has had a different view. We could hardly expect to resolve these basic differences definitively now, but the administration has been prepared to consider practical proposals that will help us achieve our common objectives in Lebanon without prejudging our respective positions on the basic issue of principle.

Thus, we are gratified that an agreement has been reached among the bipartisan leadership of the Congress to introduce and seek to enact a resolution authorizing the continued presence and mission of the U.S. peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. The President said yesterday that while he has substantial reservations about parts of the proposed resolution, he would be willing to sign it while expressing those reservations.

We are especially pleased that the proposed resolution not only supports our policies in Lebanon, but should enable us to advance our national interests on the solid bipartisan basis that has been the traditional hallmark of American foreign policy.

At stake in Lebanon are some basic principles of international law and international morality that have wider relevance for American foreign policy. At stake is a small country's right to decide for itself how to achieve its sovereign objectives free from outside pressure, threat, or blackmail. At stake is the principle that international disputes should be settled by peaceful means, not by the use or threat of force. At stake also are some concerns that affect our national interest and the security of our friends and allies.

If American efforts for peaceful solutions are overwhelmed by brute force, our role is that much weakened everywhere. Friends who rely on us will be disheartened, and will be that much less secure. Moderates in the Arab world whom we are encouraging to take risks for peace will feel it far less safe to do so. The Soviet Union's efforts to disrupt our diplomacy will have scored a victory. Radical and rejectionist elements will be strengthened. The cause of peace and justice will have suffered a setback. Israel's security on its northern border will be weakened.

What we are doing in Lebanon is right. There are risks involved, but any important undertaking involves risks. If we want the role and influence of a great power, we have to accept the responsibilities of a great power. Many millions of people around the world look to us as the strongest defender of freedom, justice, and peace. We cannot walk away from responsibilities without paying a moral and political price.

I prefer to look at it positively. After all the experience of the last 15 years, nothing would give more reassurance and hope to all our friends in the world than to see the President and Congress working in harmony, united behind a strong and purposeful national policy. That is our opportunity now. We cannot afford to let it slip away.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Mr. Secretary, very much.

General Kelley, do you have a prepared statement that you want to make? I ask only because we have a vote on the floor that will last about 5 minutes. How long will your comments be?

STATEMENT OF GEN. PAUL X. KELLEY, COMMANDANT, U.S. MARINE CORPS

General KELLEY. I do not have a prepared statement. I just want to make an opening remark or two, Mr. Chairman.

First, I apologize for not having a prepared statement, but I have been where I like to be most of all for the past 2 days, with marines in the field, at Camp LeJeune and Cherry Point. I came back specifically for this hearing, because of its importance to our marines and to the safety of our marines in Lebanon.

I will be returning as soon as this hearing is over, back to get into my camouflage utilities with the marines that I do appreciate.

The CHAIRMAN. We appreciate your being here.

General KELLEY. One thing that I wanted to emphasize from the Secretary's statement, and we feel it very acutely in Lebanon, is the fact that we are part of a multinational force, and as part of a multinational force, this is a commitment of four nations, four military forces. We have on the ground over there, and I was there last month, Mr. Chairman, four of the cream, if you would, of what I think is available within these countries performing very well on the ground. My hat is off to them.

The performance of duty, this kind of duty, peacekeeping duty, is not new and unique to marines. We have been doing this off and on for some 208 years, whenever our country requires it. The morale of our marines is high, and we are prepared to do whatever is right for our country, sir.

The CHAIRMAN. Thank you very much indeed, General.

Senator Boschwitz, have you voted?

Senator BOSCHWITZ. No.

The CHAIRMAN. I will ask just as soon as a Senator returns who has voted that he take up the gavel and begin so we can conserve as much time as possible. We will be back in about 5 minutes, and we will recess temporarily.

[Whereupon, a brief recess was taken.]

Senator KASSEBAUM [presiding]. The hearing will come to order. The chairman asked that the first Senator back begin. My apologies, Mr. Secretary, for these interruptions. Senator Murkowski?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you, Madam Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, it is my understanding that all agencies for international development aid and U.S. information agencies and the personnel have been withdrawn from Beirut at this time. My question specifically is, if this is true, could you elaborate on the reasons why they have been withdrawn? Does it reflect on civilian U.S. personnel, on the danger to civilians in that part of the world today?

Secretary SHULTZ. We should not have any people who really do not have to be there present, Government people. And there has not been any general evacuation or anything of that kind, but on the whole we have discouraged travel to Beirut. They have enough

to do without coping with people coming in, and you always have to find places for them to stay, and so on.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So these people in your opinion are not necessary in the sense of the danger that is evidenced there now.

Secretary SHULTZ. It is a question of, could they just as easily get their work done a month from now or some other time, or do they to be there right at this moment?

Senator MURKOWSKI. Madam Chairman, my second question is this. With the recent shelling as a consequence of our naval forces, what is your assessment of the likelihood of a serious effort being made to sink one of our naval ships as a concentrated effort to escalate this general situation?

Secretary SHULTZ. My impression is that our ships and their command and so on know how to take care of themselves very well.

Senator MURKOWSKI. So that chance is always there, but they are making every effort to take evasive action?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, they have means of dealing with attacks of one kind or another.

Senator MURKOWSKI. My last question, Mr. Secretary, is this. In your statement, you outlined specifically what is at stake in Lebanon, and I certainly concur, but I wonder if you could elaborate a little bit more on how we get out of this situation ultimately. You have indicated in general terms, but I wonder specifically what has to happen initially, what constitutes the right timing.

Secretary SHULTZ. I guess the way we would like to have the situation go would be for foreign forces to leave, Israeli, Syrian, PLO, and others, and for the Government to bring about the kind of national reconciliation they are bringing about so that they are able to control their territory, and then we would leave. That has been the idea all along, and that continues to be the ideal way in which this would come about.

Some variable on that is what our objective is.

Senator MURKOWSKI. You indicated that a cease fire will only come about when all parties conclude it is in their interest, and we can help to enhance that that interest, but if those particular parties want to prevail over an extended period of time, then it is our option to wait them out, so to speak?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think our course is that we stay there, we continue to perform our mission, which is an important one, as I have tried to outline, and if our forces are attacked, we defend ourselves. That is our stance, and that is what we intend to continue to do.

Senator MURKOWSKI. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Murkowski, very much, for filling in while we were gone.

Mr. Secretary, specifically, on Friday we will have before us at least one resolution which Senator Baker and I have introduced which is identical to the House resolution, possibly a Mathias resolution, the details of which I believe you have available. It simply would provide for a 6-month authorization for U.S. involvement in the multinational force.

Senator PELL. Excuse me. Also possibly a Byrd resolution.

The CHAIRMAN. Yes; possibly also a Byrd resolution. Would you care to comment on the administration's view on each of those three resolutions, and the reasons why I believe you are supporting the resolution that was introduced by Senator Baker and me, and by Chairman Zablocki in the House?

Secretary SHULTZ. The administration worked with the congressional leadership, including you, to see if we could not resolve this question. As a result of those discussions on a bipartisan basis, the resolution that you and Senator Baker introduced and that was introduced in the House by, I believe, the Speaker and Chairman Zablocki, and quite a long list of cosponsors, was agreed to.

We think that is a resolution that we can live with. The President, as I stated, and as you stated, has agreed to sign it, although he has reservations, and he will state his reservations along with his signature. So what we would like to see happen now, is for that resolution to be voted on, and that broad consensus be possible throughout the world and in the Middle East from the Congress supporting that position. That is where we are.

The other resolutions, we think, are much less desirable than the one that you offered, and that is in considerable part because on a practical basis they put the President in the position where in a period of time not too far away there is going to start to be a build-up of interest in what the Congress is going to do after 60 days has run out, or after 90 days has run out, or after 6 months has run out, and our adversaries will start to try to maneuver the situation on the ground to have an impact on the vote here, and people will be lobbying, and so on, from foreign countries. We do not think that is a desirable situation to have.

Beyond that, there is the constitutional problem that the President feels strongly about, and I would even suggest that if any one of you were President, you might very well have the same view that he does, that as Commander in Chief, by the Constitution, and thinking not only of this situation but of the office of the Presidency and of his successors, that to put himself into a position where American Forces, of which he is the Commander in Chief, must automatically be redeployed as a result of inaction by the Congress is no position for a Commander in Chief.

Now, that is an important reservation in practical terms and in constitutional terms. I do not know exactly how the President will state his reservations, but I think that is probably the guts of it. The resolution that you have introduced and the parallel one in the House has the effect, we believe, of allowing that constitutional question to be preserved as a question not foreclosed in either direction, but it allows us to get on with what we are trying to accomplish here, and not put any immediate deadline into play that itself becomes a factor in the situation.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether Senator Mathias intends to introduce his resolution, but I did tell him that I commended the principle that the War Powers Act should be put into play now, but I did not feel that that short a frame would be desirable. It could cause the wrong signal to be sent to our adversaries, and we would not want that. But I do believe, and I commend the administration for working this out in such a way that the law can be now implemented without confrontation, and that we do have a timeframe in

which we can try to work this situation out and achieve the three stated objectives of the administration.

There has been much discussion as to whether we are really getting involved in a civil war, and whether the current conflict in Lebanon is in effect a civil war. We also know that Palestinians, Iranians, Syrians, and others are assisting the forces opposed to President Gemayel. Could you give us your views as to whether this is a civil war? If so, how can it be in our interest to be involved in a civil war? If not, who is the opposition, in your judgment, and what is the objective of that opposition?

Secretary SHULTZ. First of all, Mr. Chairman, there is a Government of Lebanon, a legitimate Government of Lebanon, and only one. It was produced out of a process that is obviously fragile and difficult, but nevertheless, through that process emerged the government of President Gemayel. We all know, everybody knows that there are great confessional tensions in Lebanon, and we have seen expressions of them. That is basically their problem. It is not our role to try to interfere or to get into the middle of that.

On the other hand, the evidence is mounting, and the situation more and more is emerging that the fundamental responsibility for the violence is not so much the confessional tensions as it is the instigation and the presence and the fighting of non-Lebanese forces. That, I think, presents a situation different from a civil war. That presents a situation where non-Lebanese forces are challenging the legitimate Government of Lebanon and trying in effect to topple it.

The CHAIRMAN. There are conflicting reports, Mr. Secretary, on the degree of support being provided to the current Lebanese Government. Moslem and Christian Lebanese leaders from Lebanon have communicated that there is widespread support for President Gemayel, yet on the other hand American Druze contend that the support for President Gemayel is limited. How widespread is the support for the current Gemayel government in Lebanon?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not have any way of knowing, other than the fact that the process that produced that government is as close to having its lines to the various confessional groups as you can get. The prime minister is a Moslem. In constructing the Lebanese armed force, a great effort was made to include throughout the various confessional groups. Its composition has been greater than 50 percent Moslem, so a considerable effort has been made to give it representative quality.

Now, it is the case that there are leading political figures who are recognized as leaders of different groups who are not in the government, and President Gemayel, as the situation moves along, has sought to bring about a broadened political base. He has made that offer and asked for a conference. He is in the process of trying to widen the support for his government. We encourage that and agree with that effort.

The CHAIRMAN. My final question is this. We have a situation where 50 percent of Lebanon is occupied by Syria, 25 percent by Israel, and much of the remaining country controlled by one or more of two dozen different militias. It is far from a unified country at this stage. You did mention in your testimony the three objectives that we have. They were the same three objectives that

were announced by the administration 1 year ago. So our objectives continue to be the same.

Could you give us an assessment as to what progress you feel is being achieved or can be achieved in each of those three objectives namely, to support the Lebanese Government in efforts to reassert its own power with foreign forces; the second, to facilitate withdrawal of all foreign forces; and third, to make certain that Israel's northern border is safe and secure?

Secretary SHULTZ. We feel on the first point that considerable progress has been made in the strength of the Lebanese armed forces and its composition, and in the efforts of President Gemayel to broaden the base of his government. As far as the second point is concerned, Israel has agreed to withdraw and an agreement, as we all know, has been worked out that set out the conditions under which that would take place.

Syria so far has been unwilling to engage with Lebanon in a discussion of the conditions under which it would withdraw. Lebanon has formally asked Syria to withdraw. The same goes for the PLO. Of course, we do not deal directly with the PLO, but the Lebanese have, and I would have to say that as the Syrians find that they can support the PLO and try to make progress in controlling the country themselves, without withdrawing, they seem to keep pushing, and the Lebanese are requesting them to withdraw, and trying to develop and ability to push back.

I think if they can sustain that, then perhaps there is some basis for hoping that foreign forces would actually withdraw.

As far as the third objective is concerned, of course, Israel still occupies southern Lebanon, although they have stated their willingness to withdraw. They have agreed to it. I think there is absolutely no doubt that they are ready to withdraw, but they also, I am sure, want to see to it that when that happens, they do not again get subjected to attack from southern Lebanon. I think everyone agrees that that is a legitimate concern. The Lebanese do, and in my discussions, even the Syrians agree that that is legitimate.

The CHAIRMAN. I thank you very much. I want personally to thank you for responding to our invitation so quickly.

I will be leaving for the meeting at the White House on arms control. Senator Lugar, I wonder if you would be good enough to chair. Senator Pell, you are next.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, in accepting the compromise Baker resolution, does the administration agree that upon the expiration of the 18-month period there must either be another congressional authorization or the Marines are withdrawn?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, I think at the end of the 18-month period we are sort of going to be back where we are now, and we have to consider this issue, and of course we do not know what the conditions will be at the end of 18 months. Perhaps things will have improved greatly, and the Marines will not be there. We just cannot foresee that, or at least I cannot foresee that.

Senator PELL. I can understand your not wanting to be too specific, but I would like you to be maybe a little bit more specific than you have been. If the Marines are still there and the 18 months

have expired, would you then believe that the administration should seek further authorization, or would you agree that the Marines must be withdrawn under the law?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think that situation would have to be confronted, and I do not think that the President would want to make some flat commitment about what he is going to do with the U.S. Armed Forces some place 18 months from now, not knowing what the situation would be, but I would also expect, as I think the efforts that have been made here in the last couple of weeks show, that the Congress is sensible and interested in the objectives of the United States, and that somehow or other we will find a way through that period.

Senator PELL. I will not press you any further than that, because I do understand the position that you are in. I think some of us in the Congress would like a more specific assurance, but I recognize the difficulty there. Is it the clear understanding of the administration that both the Marines in Lebanon and/or the offshore forces are included in the authorization contained in the Baker resolution?

Secretary SHULTZ. The highly specific designation is to the Marines who are there in Lebanon as part of the multinational force. It then refers in the resolution, having specified that, that nothing in the resolution—I forget exactly the language, but at any rate, provides for the ability of the Marines to defend themselves and for the United States to provide them with those assets. That is essentially what has been put offshore. So I presume that that language refers to offshore use, but it does not authorize the landing of additional Marines or things of that kind.

Senator PELL. But in your view it does authorize the use of fire power from those vessels?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not think it takes a congressional authorization to authorize a marine to defend himself. I think that goes without saying. The United States, when we deploy Marines some place, should support them, and given them the backing that is necessary. That is just what is being put there.

Senator PELL. Well, then, being specific, we can both agree that the Marines should be able to defend themselves, and if they cannot defend themselves, offshore vessels should be able to help, but that is to defend the Marines. Would you agree that there should be no further use of those offshore vessels than to help the Marines in their own self-defense?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we are talking about the defense not only of the Marines but of Americans in Lebanon. We have an Embassy there which took a lot of casualties. You can make out a case that the most dangerous occupation with all due respect is not so much the Marines these days as being a Foreign Service officer, and they deserve to be supported as well, and our Ambassador's residence is sort of a headquarters where everybody goes, so we feel if those places are fired on we should defend those places.

Senator PELL. You are so right. I think more Ambassadors have been killed in the line of duty since World War II than general officers in the armed services. It is a very hazardous occupation indeed. Tomorrow, Chairman Percy and I are managing the State Department authorization bill, and I hope the Department will au-

thorize danger pay for those Foreign Service officers where their families are with them and it is still a dangerous situation. Hopefully we will have your support in that.

I would like to ask General Kelley under whose command the commanding officer reports. To whom does you commanding officer out there report directly?

General KELLEY. He goes through the standard chain of command, Senator Pell. He in fact is part of the amphibious task force that is in the vicinity which in turn reports to the commander's 6th Fleet, so he is a component of the commander's 6th Fleet, which in turn reports to the naval component commander of CIN CEUR, General Rogers, who in turn reports back to the National Command Authority. So it is a continuous chain through the National Command Authority, through the naval chain, down through the 24th MAU.

Senator PELL. He gets his orders only through that line of command, not from the Ambassador, or not from anyone else?

General KELLEY. Not military orders. There is a standard country team relationship which always exists in any country, but as far as his military orders, he gets those through the military chain of command.

Senator PELL. Now, would there be a similar chain of command for the other three members of the Multinational Force there?

General KELLEY. I truthfully cannot speak to those, Senator Pell. I am not sure. There may be some subtle differences, and I probably would be ill advised to talk to them, since I am not fully conversant with them.

Senator PELL. But there is no common command then for all foreign forces?

General KELLEY. When you say command, that is very specific to me. There is a multinational force coordinating committee, and all four members of the multinational force sit on that coordinating committee. So there is a day-to-day relationship in the exchange of liaison officers. It is a very effective system as it is worked out on the ground.

Senator PELL. Where does that committee meet?

General KELLEY. That committee meets in Beirut.

Senator PELL. I see. Then your commanding officer out there, the colonel, would have a liaison attached to that?

General KELLEY. That is exactly the way it would work, Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you.

Mr. Secretary, does finding No. 5 of the compromise resolution, which states that the U.S. Armed Forces are now in hostilities, nullify the commitment that our bilateral agreement with Lebanon, which very explicitly stated, "in carrying out its mission, the American forces will not engage in combat?"

It seems to me there is a certain contradiction here, and one or the other must be avoided.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, this is a congressional resolution, and I do not know quite how one interprets words like "hostility" and "combat." I have discovered when I start doing things like that before Members of the Senate, and it turns out most of them are lawyers, I am at a disadvantage. I think the sentence in the re-

quest of the Government of Lebanon about not engaging in combat was, there was not any expectation from the Government of Lebanon that these forces were going to undertake active combat missions of some kind.

There is nothing in this situation that alters that in any way whatever.

Senator PELL. Mr. Secretary, I have several questions from the minority leader, Senator Byrd, which I will ask as my time permits, if that is agreeable with you.

His first question is this. On Monday of this week, the French foreign minister criticized the American bombardment of Druze militia. The foreign minister stated that France wanted the present mulinational peacekeeping force replaced by an enlarged U.N. force. Otherwise, the French expressed the fear that the present confrontation would lead to Lebanon's partition.

The bill supported by the administration, while triggering the War Powers Resolution, authorized the continued deployment of U.S. Marines as participants in the multinational peacekeeping force. Therefore, the question is, what happens if one nation, such as France, withdraws from the MNF?

Secretary SHULTZ. I would first make a comment on the statement of fact, and who was fired upon. The aggressive forces were fired upon, and as I have tried to bring out here, the evidence is mounting that a very considerable component and direction of those forces is non-Lebanese, in other words, not Druze.

Now, as far as the coherence of the multinational force is concerned, it has worked well. There are always tensions in these things, and on the whole, however, there is an agreement that before any country takes any action with its force, that there will be consultation. That has worked, and I would expect if someone has a change of heart about what they want to do, we will talk it over very carefully before anything is done.

As of whatever week it was that I was in Madrid, we had a meeting of the foreign ministers, including the French foreign minister, and we discussed the situation thoroughly. There was no indication of anyone intending to pull out of the multinational force.

Senator PELL. Incidentally, what has happened to that United Nations force I remember seeing in the southern part of Lebanon?

Secretary SHULTZ. The UNIFIL force is still there. Its mandate is unchanged. But it does not have the ability to do very much, because the situation does not lend itself to that. I think we are very fortunate in the fact that countries have been willing to stay with that UNIFIL force, and maintain forces there, so that if finally we are able to get an agreement whereby foreign forces leave, it will be possible to use that force for a variety of other missions that are certainly needed there, and of course the greater the degree to which the United Nations is able to shoulder this burden, the less the multinational force will have to do.

I have to take note of the fact that when you are dealing with the U.N. force, you are also dealing always with the possibility of a Soviet veto, which they do not have over the multinational force.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. My time has expired.

Senator LUGAR. Mr. Secretary, I commend the administration and bipartisan congressional leadership for the resolution that Senator Baker and Senator Percy have introduced in the Senate.

But I suppose the gist of my problem with the testimony today is the highlight you have in your testimony where you say "The problem, of course, has been Syria. Our policy and that of Lebanon has had two tracks: foreign troop withdrawal and national reconciliation. Both these tracks have been blocked by Syria, which has been heavily rearmed by the Soviet Union since last summer."

The question that I have for you is, given this situation, which I think is an accurate summary, Why would we anticipate that Syria, given just the component that we have of 1,200 people plus the multinational allies that we have there, why would they be in any way deterred from continuing to put pressure upon Lebanese components or to carry on foreign policy goals of their own, which may very well be hegemony over a good part of Lebanon?

Secretary SHULTZ. Syria, I am sure, will continue to push its interests as far as it can, and will respect force. The Lebanese Armed Force is giving a good account of itself, and so we are supporting that and trying to be helpful. The multinational force is small. It is there. And it brings an element of stability into the picture, and international support into the picture. There are many governments in the world, including many Arab governments, that are very concerned about the prospect of one Arab government by force of arms destroying another Arab government. So I do not think that is necessarily all that popular a thing in the Arab world.

Beyond that, one wonders, with all due recognition of the fact that there are many tensions among the confessional groups, the extent to which those confessional groups may react to being used by Syria for its objectives. Remember, we are very concerned about our marines who have been killed and wounded. The number of Lebanese that have been killed in this is very large indeed. So that must have some impact. So I think there are forces in the picture that have to be considered, and I do not rule out of this complex of considerations the fact that Israel, as it looks at what is happening north of the Awwali River, must consider its interests as well.

It, I think, definitely does not have an interest in a Syrian-Palestinian dominated Lebanon.

Senator LUGAR. I am certain that that is so, but as a part of our policy then by maintaining the same number of troops to induce Israel to play a larger role.

Secretary SHULTZ. Israel has taken a posture. It has redeployed to the Awwali River line. Since that time some new elements have entered the picture, particularly the PLO. I am not trying to say what people ought to do, but you ask what it is that might give the Syrians pause, and I tried to make a list of things that might give them pause.

Senator LUGAR. So our thought in all of this is neither to go forward or back but to try to lay out for the parties what appear to be the best interests for them, and to try to help them reach the right conclusions?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think that is right. At the same time, we have a mission, the multinational force does, and the marines are

part of it, and so I think it is important for us to be true to that mission. We do not hold that that mission is going to solve all the problems. Other people have to do lots of things, and mainly it is up to the Lebanese to do things, but that mission plays a role, and what we are saying is that we should continue with that.

Senator LUGAR. As just a point of information, is there evidence of Soviet activity in Lebanon, and has Soviet activity with regard to the Syrians increased beyond the troops that are there at the SA-5 missile sites?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, of course, the Soviet activity has been to resupply the Syrians, to put the surface-to-air missile systems in Syria, and to man them. We estimate there are some 7,000 or so Soviets in Syria. We do not have any evidence that there are organized Russian groups in the Bekaa or in other parts of Lebanon, but you do hear reports of individuals or whatever around in through there.

So, the Soviet influence is definitely present. I do not want to sit here and say that they are responsible for stirring all this up there. It is very easy to stir things up.

Senator LUGAR. Is there evidence of reentry of PLO forces into the Beirut area?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

Senator LUGAR. To what extent?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is scattered infiltration into the Beirut area as such, but in the Suq Al-Gharb area, which is the difference of where we are sitting to the White House—it is not very far—that is where this battle is going on, and our evidence is that there is a very heavy Palestinian involvement in that.

Senator LUGAR. Given the problems as you see them, do you feel comfortable with the request that is implied in this resolution for no more U.S. troops than are now covered? Is it not only conceivable, but one might even think probable that if our mission is to be successful, a great many more people would be required, and if so, what would be the course of the administration's action in asking for further cover under this resolution or others for them?

Secretary SHULTZ. There is no plan to change the mission that we have in Lebanon. If such a plan should emerge, we would consult with the Congress about it, and you would know about it as a matter of course. That has been set out, for example, in the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act. Well, that is probably not the right name for the act, but the one that authorizes funds for 1983 makes a provision along that line. So if there is any change in mission or numbers, then we would come back to the Congress and consult with you about that.

Senator LUGAR. Are the activities envisioned in Lebanon covered by the defense budget request the administration has made?

Secretary SHULTZ. There is a supplemental that deals with Lebanon as such, but I think everything that is going on that we are doing is proper, and comes either under that bill or the defense bill. I am not sure exactly how this lays itself out.

Senator LUGAR. What further diplomatic initiatives on our part are contemplated with regard to Syria? In other words, how might the dialog that would lead to some Syrian reevaluation proceed?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we go there. We meet. We talk to people in other governments. We consult with them. And we encourage them to talk to the Syrians. That is the sort of thing you do. But I do not think that you basically make a lot of headway in a tough dispute by talk unless you have something to talk about. So it is the things that need to be talked about that are the keys here. It is not by some sweet and terribly persuasive line of reasoning that you are able to get very far.

Senator LUGAR. Is an argument for our continued presence in Lebanon an argument that would go beyond simply what is occurring in Lebanon, and would foresee events that are occurring in the war of Iraq and Iran? In other words, is there importance in having a presence in the Middle East in some proximity to developments that might occur there that are extremely serious elsewhere?

Secretary SHULTZ. I would not make any connection to the war between Iraq and Iran, but as I tried to bring out in my statement, I think we have to keep in our minds the very large U.S. interests in the Middle East, the interests that we have in the well-being of Israel, and our Arab friends and resources there. All of this we have to keep in mind as we consider what we do in any particular instance.

I think in this case, were we to be forced to have a congressional vote to withdraw the Marines tomorrow or something of that kind, it would be a catastrophe.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you very much, Mr. Secretary.

Senator Glenn?

Senator GLENN. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.

I have a very short statement that I would like to read. I did not get to give it when we started out. I will take just a couple of minutes with it, and then I will ask my questions.

We all agree that stakes in Lebanon are high, and we certainly all want to see a strong and united Lebanon. We all want to see the removal of all foreign forces from Lebanon. We all want to see an enduring peace in the Middle East. The question facing us today has less to do with goals on which there is near consensus between Congress and the administration. The question before us today has to do with the means of achieving those goals and the related costs, and specifically I have yet to hear answers to the following questions. Is there any reason why we should not expect to be involved in direct armed conflict with the Syrians before this is over? There has been a buildup of their activity, more support from them to the Druze and other forces there. It would appear that with us becoming the major combatant in the area, it is going to be against the Syrians.

No. 2, how many more troops will we have to commit before we acheive success in our stated mission?

No. 3, are we, after a year of military involvement in Lebanon, closer to or farther from a peaceful resolution of the problem?

No. 4, is there any plausible scenario by which we avoid unlimited escalation of our involvement on the one hand or disastrous withdrawal under fire on the other?

Now, I have not heard any scenario on that, so I am afraid we are on a very slippery slope in Lebanon. If I am to support the

Baker amendment, we are going to have to have some answers to some of these questions. I just disagree with the 18 months of sort of a blank check.

Now, let me add a couple of other things to that. In the military, we learned very early on that you defined objectives very clearly and then you sized the force and equipment to accomplish that mission. In looking back through the letters of agreement on Lebanon that we have signed with their Government, there is a notable change here, it seems to me, because in their request to our Government, everything was sized to the Beirut area, authority over the Beirut area, forces withdrawn from the Beirut area, services temporary multinational force in the Beirut area, other references to the Beirut area, in the Beirut area, all the way through.

In our letter back to them, we say that we are going to have an American force in the Beirut area environment which permits the Lebanese Armed Forces to carry out their responsibilities in the Beirut area, so on and so on, authority over the Beirut area.

In the statements from the administration, and mainly in your statement today, Mr. Secretary, we are now saying a sovereign, independent Lebanon dedicated to national unity, and able to exercise its authority throughout its national territory. Where did we upgrade this thing to a much larger operation than we had agreed to going in with the Lebanese Government?

Secretary SCHULTZ. There has not been any change whatever. Our goal right from the beginning and stated by the President has been the three things that I have stated, the withdrawal of all foreign forces, the establishment of a Government of Lebanon that is sovereign over all of its territory, and arrangements that have to do with the security of Israel's northern border. Those have been stated and restated, and have been consistently our objectives. The multinational force was introduced at a time which still obtains today when most of Lebanon is occupied by foreign forces, and the Government of Lebanon has basically the Beirut area, and some surrounding parts that it has had control over.

The role of the multinational force introduced about a year ago was to help provide stability for the Government of Lebanon in its effort to control the Beirut area and develop a Lebanese Armed Force of its own. The concept was that we would work to bring about the withdrawal of all foreign forces, and as that happens, and as the Lebanese Armed Force was trained and capable, with a confessional group mixed within it, it would have the ability to move in and bring about and assure stability throughout the country.

Now, not everything is in there, but that has been the concept all along, and I think it has been very clearly known by everybody. We all foresaw that if there came to be an agreement for the removal of all foreign forces, and you had a situation where people were wanting to work together and create this kind of government, there might very well be a change in the mission of the Multinational Force, and if there was, of course, we would come and discuss it with the Congress.

So, I do not see any shift, change, or contradiction at all.

Senator GLENN. The reason I said something about the sizing of forces is, it seems to me that is very important, because there are

some 5,000 multinational force troops in there, including our 1,200 or 1,700 Marines, whichever figure is correct now, and some 7,000 UNIFIL troops. If we organized with all of these troops there, we might be able to give a measure of real, honest-to-goodness military stability to the Beirut area itself.

But when our objective is authority throughout the national territory, as your statement says, then I would ask General Kelly how many marines he thinks we would need to accomplish stability throughout all the national territory.

Secretary SHULTZ. We have not undertaken to try to do that through the operation of the Multinational Force. The concept has been the Multinational Forces in Beirut, and if we can bring about withdrawal of all foreign forces, meantime training the Lebanese Armed Forces, then it is up to them to shoulder the burden, the main burden of that duty, and if in that context it turns out that there are some additional missions for our forces and others, we can confront that as we come along.

For instance, it has always been thought there might be a mission of occupying certain road crossings, or port facilities, or things of that kind that tend to be the key in the operation of the infrastructure of a country. That is the sort of thing people had in mind, but that is for the future, and unfortunately, we seem to be a long way from getting the withdrawal of Syrian forces and PLO forces.

Senator GLENN. Apparently we have now conducted naval gunfire when the marines were not being directly fired upon, so that was a new wrinkle in the war, a new escalation, as I think it was interpreted by most nations, and the French in particular were very critical of that, according to reports, and were supposedly reassessing their position.

What can you tell us about that? Are the French going to remain in as part of the Multinational Force? Are they altering the role? What is the French view of our new bombardment, without being under direct fire?

Secretary SHULTZ. I have no information other than the French continue to and intend to remain in the multinational force. They made the comment that you referred to. Our marines are at that airport, and the height that we are talking about overlooks their position. Earlier today, General Kelley said, if the Palestinians get there, they will be looking down our throats, and that is not a very comfortable position to be in.

So, within the concept of self-defense, those artillery were authorized within that concept. Now, the French are not having their throats looked down. We are.

Senator GLENN. Are the reports that the Syrians have the Exocet missile that was used against the British ships in the Falklands accurate? Is that a correct report? Do you know?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not have any information on that.

Senator GLENN. Do you know, General Kelley?

General KELLEY. I have not heard that, sir.

Senator GLENN. In the Baker proposal, what is the rationale for the 18-month length of time that this would be in effect?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, you would have to ask the Members of the Congress who put that together. We responded to that proposal.

But I would personally view it something like this. One of the great problems, both from a practical standpoint and a constitutional standpoint, with the way the War Powers Act is set up is that it tiggers if a section 4(a)(1) filing is made a 60- or 90-day period after which, if the Congress does not do anything, the President must move those troops.

As Commander in Chief, that is not a very good position to allow yourself to be put into. Now, therefore, successive Presidents have had great reservations about this particular provision, and President Reagan shares that concern. The 18-month period seemed like a long enough period so that you had some room for maneuver, and it had the effect of allowing people who were concerned both on the congressional side of this constitutional issue and the Presidential side both to keep their principles intact and to move forward in support of the mission that we are trying to achieve there. That was the magic of it.

If you start taking shorter periods, what you do is, you give people abroad who may be opposing us incentives to think that if they wait it out, or if they cause enough commotion, or if they lobby the Congress hard enough at a certain time and so on, they will get the Congress to pull the plug out from under our policies, and so some lengthy period is desirable.

That does not mean that the Marines are necessarily going to stay there that long, or, as it is phrased, that they would necessarily leave at that time. So it is desirable not to give your opponents the information on what you are going to do to that degree.

Senator GLENN. My time is up.

General Kelley, may I have just one very short comment, if you would? Are we authorized to use helicopters in support of the Lebanese forces now, quite apart from the Marines being under attack directly?

General KELLEY. No, sir, we do not use our helicopters in direct support of Lebanese forces.

Senator GLENN. Thank you.

Senator KASSEBAUM [presiding]. Mr. Secretary, I will continue to ask some questions, and maybe by the time I get through there will be others who will return.

I want to follow up on a couple of things that have in broad outline been asked before. You made the comment that the Lebanese Armed Forces have given a good account of themselves, and I think indeed this is so, but for how much longer do you think this can go on? This undoubtedly is a great strain on them. And I suppose the next several days may be a telling point. Is this not a real problem?

Secretary SHULTZ. They have given a good account of themselves. They are fighting very well. They have taken casualties. They obviously are engaged in a tiring kind of exercise. I have heard people say just what you have said for quite a long while now, that they are about to run out of gas, and so on, but they have kept going.

I think the best stance for us is to continue to support them, and to just stay in that position, and not speculate about what may or may not happen at some future point.

Senator KASSEBAUM. There was some thought that toward the end of last week a cease-fire might have been imminent, and per-

haps that still is. I am sure those negotiations are somewhat built on quicksand at best.

Secretary SHULTZ. They are very intense negotiations, and to a certain degree they depend, as I have said, less on your power of persuasion in a meeting and more on the stability that is able to be achieved on the ground.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I would agree with that, but also let me ask you this. Is it not a question perhaps of being able to gather strong support from other nations there in the Mideast that we need, that there has to be, as you say, a broadening of the base and the composition of the Government. Just how likely is it that the Druze will be included?

Secretary SHULTZ. They have been offered to come in and take part of the discussions. President Gamayel has been pursuing that. It is also the case that there are Druze in the Lebanese Armed Force. They have made an effort consistently to reach out to the different confessional groups. I am sure President Gamayel will continue to do so.

Senator KASSEBAUM. But this seems to be a real concern among some of the other nations that the Druze leadership has not been perhaps included, and perhaps maybe the offer has been extended, and they have regretted. If that is the case, I would be curious to know why they have not accepted an offer for negotiation or participation.

Secretary SHULTZ. I cannot speak for them. They have been invited. They have not come in as yet. Without respect to any particular person or confessional group, because I do not want to engage in a discussion that causes problems over there, but I do know of instances in which people agreed on certain things, and then said, well, I guess this is going to be all right, but I want to check with Syria, and then they came back and said, no dice.

So I think the evidence that Syria has not been supporting this effort at national reconciliation is quite clear.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Do you think with the return of Arafat the PLO role is going to continue to expand? How do you interpret his return?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the PLO will expand its role as much as it is able to do, and they have been coming back into the area vacated by Israel, and there has been some infiltration, as far as our information is, into the Beirut area itself.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Regarding the multinational coordinating committee, I was curious when you said the French were not there at the airport. I certainly think we have to protect our marines who are there, and provide them the cover and all of the support that is necessary. I would have no reason to question artillery fire from the fleet, but is this something that we did notify through the multinational coordinating committee that this action was going to be taken? Is this a decision that goes through them?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is not a decision that goes through them in the sense that the multinational force has some sort of command over each of the forces, but we all do consult together, and the fact that this authorization had ben given and why was known in advance to our partners.

Senator KASSEBAUM. What if England, France and Italy had all said that they did not think this was a good idea?

Secretary SHULTZ. Of course, we have to listen to what everyone says and their views. A lot of the extent to which people think it is a good idea or not depends on what you think the facts are, and the quotation from the French foreign minister seems to suggest that the facts as he saw them were that this was a Druze versus the LAF problem, and our information is that there is a very heavy overlay of Palestinian and other non-Lebanese forces involved that are trying to overthrow the LAF position there.

So, I think that made some difference, but in the end, we have to be responsible for defending our forces. We cannot turn that over to somebody else.

Senator KASSEBAUM. I am curious, and I just do not know. Are our forces mixed with the multinational forces, or are we positioned in some areas in the French and some in the English and others, et cetera?

Secretary SHULTZ. No. Each element in the multinational force has an understood mission, and they are each in a separate part of the greater Beirut area.

Senator KASSEBAUM. So there is no area where we are all combined?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, we do not have joint controls or joint forces, because it is much easier, I think, in your command and control to keep the units separate, but there is a very effective coordinating procedure.

General KELLEY. I would say in elaboration you asked the question about the attitude of the other three. We have had tremendous cooperation in supporting one another, but I will say in all honesty, Senator, that the desire to return fire is always sharpened by the fact that you are the one being fired upon.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Yes, indeed, that certainly makes good sense.

I have one final question. What, Mr. Secretary, are we doing or can we do to pressure President Gemayel to reach out and try to be aggressive in broadening the base of his government? It seems to me this must be a key point at this time.

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, it is, and he is doing that. He is trying to do that. It is a question of, you can lead a horse to water, but you cannot make him drink. He has called for a national reconciliation and he is ready to do it. But that does not mean that people are going to agree and come in and work together. It takes a while.

Senator KASSEBAUM. Thank you.

Senator LUGAR [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Kassebaum.

Senator Tsongas.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I think bipartisanship that has been shown on this is very healthy. I am not sure why it exists. I think part of it is the fact that nobody really has a better idea, and anyone who would argue against the resolution I think has some obligation to suggest what you would do differently. That is, in essence, where everything breaks down.

I intend, with reservations on the time of 18 months, to support the resolution, because I cannot honestly say to you what I think is

a better alternative. On the time issue, do I understand correctly that the President will not sign any resolution that differs from the 18-month period?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, what I can tell you is, if the President could write the resolution it would not be what had been agreed on. Starting from what he felt and what others felt in the Congress, there was an intensive negotiation conducted and a number of meetings back and forth, and what emerged was the resolution that was introduced in the House and the Senate. And the President has said he will sign that.

And so that is the information I can provide. If you say, would he sign it if this were changed a little or that were changed a little, I cannot respond to that.

Senator TSONGAS. Is there an agreed upon position as to what the administration would do were the time reduced to, let us say 12 months?

Secretary SHULTZ. As I said earlier, I think as you reduce the time you bring into focus more and more the constitutional issue that does not seem to be resolveable through discussion.

And you also bring more and more into play the practical consideration of telling your adversaries in advance what you are going to do with your armed forces, and inviting them to try to have an impact on a vote that might take place or to wait around for that period of time to take effect, or things of that kind.

And there is nothing about the 18 months. I do not know how that came out. I think it was in the original Zablocki resolution. It was one of the starting points here. But it seems like a reasonable number.

Senator TSONGAS. One of the difficulties that many people have in looking at the issue is it is very difficult to see how it all works itself out over the long term. The major players on the scene are: The Syrians, who are remarkably determined, with a very tough leader; the Israelis, who pretty much fall into the same category; and then the Labanese Army.

They are the major participants. As you look at that situation, it seems rather compelling that eventually you are going to have a de facto or a real partition of Lebanon. How does the Lebanese Army over time stand up to those much greater, both political and military, forces?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, the Lebanese armed force is new. It has just been going for about 9 months, I guess, and has received a lot of training and help from the United States. But it is a new force.

It is not as large in total as the force Syria has in Lebanon. Syria has 40,000 troops in Lebanon, more or less. The Palestinians have several thousand, maybe 9,000, 10,000 or 11,000, some number like that. Of course, the Israeli troop strength in Lebanon is down considerably now, but they have a very strong armed force.

The Lebanese armed force is not in that category, and it is designed to be able to handle a situation within Lebanon as foreign forces withdraw, to be an agent for stability in Lebanon. It was not set up as a force designed to take on the Syrian Army or the Israeli Army or whatever.

Senator TSONGAS. Do the Syrians have the capacity at present to launch missiles against our airplanes and our naval ships off the coast?

Secretary SHULTZ. The surface-to-air missiles in Syria, as we understand it, our intelligence is that they are manned by the Russians. Those missiles have a range that takes them out over Lebanon and, for that matter, into Israel.

So they could shoot at planes that are well outside Syrian air space. I will put it that way.

Senator TSONGAS. And missiles that would be fired at naval vessels, would the same situation apply?

Secretary SHULTZ. Those would be surface-to-surface type missiles, and I do not think they have that capability in Syria. That does not mean there are not weapons around that they might be able to find that would be usable in that regard.

At the same time, as I understand it, our naval vessels have a very good capacity to defend themselves and they are on the alert.

Senator TSONGAS. I have tried hypotheticals with you often enough not to try one again.

Secretary SHULTZ. Thank you.

Senator TSONGAS. If the Syrians were to mount a major offensive, the suggestion in the press yesterday was that the Israelis would feel compelled to meet that, if the Syrians came in in number to support the Druze. What is your understanding as to what the Israelis said yesterday? I believe it was Moshe Arens who said that.

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not have any information to contribute on that beyond what has been said.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, I cannot imagine that the Israelis would simply sit back and allow the Syrians to just take everything back, after all of the agony of last year.

Secretary SHULTZ. I think a Lebanon dominated by Syria and the PLO is not the kind of Lebanon that is good for the security of Israel.

Senator TSONGAS. I was going to ask you a question on how you would see a de facto partition of Lebanon, but I cannot imagine your answering that question, unless you want to volunteer to.

Secretary SHULTZ. No.

Senator TSONGAS. Well, I think it is a very difficult situation. I must say, I do not have a good answer, and I am willing to be reasonably supportive. The time thing could be resolved. I would hope this might set a precedent where there are ways of discussing foreign policy issues, such as in Central America, where perhaps a greater effort could be made to see each other's point of view.

Secretary SHULTZ. Oh, I subscribe to that.

Senator TSONGAS. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Tsongas.

Senator Sarbanes.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. Secretary, I want to try to develop with you the breadth and range of the authorization that the administration is seeking from the Congress. I think I can do that by making reference to provisions of the resolution and obtaining your understanding of them.

Is it the administration's view that at the end of the 18-month period that the President, pursuant to the other constitutional powers which the President asserts, could maintain troops there without a congressional authorization?

Secretary SHULTZ. If we get to the end of the 18-month period, of course, we do not know what the fact situation will be. The resolution sets out conditions for termination, including an 18-month period, and provides for, and unless the Congress votes I think it is fair to say, as Chairman Zablocki stated this morning in the House, that essentially you would be constitutionally where we are right now.

Senator SARBANES. In other words, the administration does assert the constitutional authority to maintain the troops under the other provisions of the constitution, is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. The President has stated that he will sign this resolution, and among the reasons for doing so is it seems to be a way of preserving the constitutional principles that each side to this negotiation feels are of great importance, without prejudging them one way or another.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that, and I take it the reservation which the president is going to express upon the signing—I have not seen what that reservation is going to be; I have only been told that he is going to express reservations—I take it will run to an assertion that he does have constitutional authority acting as Commander in Chief to commit these troops and to keep them there; is that correct? Is that the reservation that will be made?

Secretary SHULTZ. I certainly would expect that the heart of the reservation runs to his constitutional duties as Commander in Chief.

Senator SARBANES. Then I take it, consistant with that, it is the position of the Administration that at the end of the 18-month period the President could keep the troops there pursuant to that constitutional authority?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the constitutional issue is a general one and would apply across the board. This resolution is an effort to put that issue to the side for the time being and go on to the substance of this matter.

Senator SARBANES. I take it you would be opposed, in section 6 of the resolution, to striking the language "for purposes of the War Powers Resolution" as far as the authorization for 18 months is concerned? In other words, you would not agree to the authorization being for 18 months and then it being clear that to stay there the President would have to come back to the Congress, is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. Now, the resolution also provides that,

> Nothing in this joint resolution modifies, limits or supersedes any of the provisions of the War Powers Resolution or the requirements of Section 4(a) of the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act relating to Congressional authorization for any substantial expansion in the number of or role of the United States Armed Forces in Lebanon.

Does that mean that the role or number, substantial expansion of the number or role of the U.S. Armed Forces cannot take place

without a congressional authorization? Or would the Executive again assert that it could do that under the Commander in Chief powers and that therefore that question also remains open, just as the previous one does?

Secretary SHULTZ. The President has signed that statute and it is our full intention, if there is any change in the mission or a significant change in the numbers of marines deployed, to come and consult with the Congress about that as required by the law.

Senator SARBANES. As I read the law—and I am trying to be clear on this, because you did mention it earlier. You said you would come back to the Congress and consult about it.

Now, there is a difference between consultation and obtaining an authorization from the Congress. Is it the administration's position that what they need to do is consult with the Congress, or that they need to obtain an authorization from the Congress, that they could not expand the number or role without a specific congressional authorization?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the President, or perhaps any of you if you were president, thinking about your rule, your constitutional role as Commander in Chief, would be very reluctant to tie your hands and say that you could only order U.S. forces to do something or other after the Congress had authorized it.

Senator SARBANES. So it is your position, then, that you could substantially expand them without a congressional authorization?

Secretary SHULTZ. The constitutional reservation goes to the President's role as Commander in Chief, and therefore to his capacity to be in charge of the deployment of the Armed Forces of the United States. I have no doubt that he will continue to assert that role.

The effort that is being made here in putting together this resolution and in working on the Lebanon situation generally is to try to work in a collaborative and consultative fashion with the Congress, and certainly that is our intent, at the same time not to prejudice or foreclose these fundamental constitutional principles.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that. But what this questioning is bringing out is that, while the administration is here seeking an authorization from the Congress, it is reserving its authority and right to increase the numbers, increase the scope, and increase the time period, in each instance without a congressional authorization.

Secretary SHULTZ. It is the intent of the administration to consult closely with the Congress on such matters.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that. But as I pointed out, the word "consultation" and the word "authorization" are two very different things. As I understand the responses to the questions, the administration, at the same time that it is seeking to obtain this authorization, is not in any way relinquishing its assertion of authority to increase numbers, scope and time period.

Secretary SHULTZ. I can only go back to the generality of it and say that the President has no intention of turning over to the Congress his constitutional responsibilities as Commander in Chief. Now, that does not mean that you ignore the Congress wishes, and of course the Congress has to provide funds and so on. It is only

sensible to consult and try to move forward in tandem on these matters.

But in the end, as a matter of principle the President must maintain his constitutional responsibility as Commander in Chief.

Senator SARBANES. Suppose the Congress would say, we think there really ought to be a declaration of war in this instance pursuant to the Constitution, and the administration were to agree with that. Against whom would we declare war in the Lebanese situation?

Secretary SHULTZ. We have no intention of declaring war on anybody.

Senator SARBANES. Well, our troops are in hostilities. I mean, who is the hostile party?

Secretary SHULTZ. There are lots of people shooting in different directions in Lebanon, and to a certain extent we are caught in that crossfire, and to a certain extent we find ourselves in a situation where non-Lebanese forces are firing at us or are engaging themselves in areas that we find threatening to us.

So therefore, we have taken defensive measures in that regard. But this is nothing approaching a declaration of war on anybody.

I might say that we have people in embassies in various parts of the world who get shot at, and that does not mean that we declare war in that case.

Senator SARBANES. Is an attack on the Lebanese Armed Forces seen as an attack on the American marines for the purposes of calling in the air and naval support?

Secretary SHULTZ. We have not suggested that. The Suq al-Gharb area, which is the one that has brought this question up, is one which, if it falls into Palestinian hands, say, would be very threatening to the positions that we have in the airport area. It is in that regard and our self-defense that the artillery, naval artillery, has been authorized.

Senator SARBANES. Earlier you were talking about the protective measures that the resolution seeks, where it says "shall not preclude such protective measures," extend to the safety of the entire Multinational Force, is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is the way it is stated here, and the Multinational Force is cooperative and collaborative. On the other hand, each member of the Multinational Force has taken and exerts its own measures of self-defense. I think it is worth nothing that the French have brought an aircraft carrier in. There are a couple of frigates that the Italians have there. The British have put planes on a base in Cyprus and have flown some missions.

So in different ways, each unit of the Multinational Force has taken measures to support its forces there and be able to defend them.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that. But I am going again to the breadth of the authorization. As I understand it, the authorization enables you to use protective measures to insure the safety of the entire Multinational Force, is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. That is correct.

Senator SARBANES. And it is also your view that you can use protective measures, at least in certain instances, to insure the safety of the Lebanese Armed Forces, if you make a connection between

the safety of the Lebanese Armed Forces and the safety of the Multinational Forces, is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think the way to put it is that we have to think in terms of the protection of our forces.

Senator SARBANES. Our forces being the MNF forces?

Secretary SHULTZ. The MNF forces, but particularly in this case the Marines. There have not been cases in which members of the Multinational Force have asked for fire from another member, I do not think, in their support. But we do not rule out that possibility and we certainly ought to be willing to help each other in that regard.

Senator SARBANES. I see that my time is up. Are we going to have another round, Mr. Chairman? I assume that we are.

Senator LUGAR. Let me consult with the distinguished ranking member of the committee. But first let me ask the Senator from Maryland how many more minutes of questioning would be required to exhaust his list.

Senator SARBANES. I think if I had another round that would do it.

Senator LUGAR. Another 10 minutes?

Senator SARBANES. Yes, or possibly less. I could complete it in another round.

Senator LUGAR. Senator Pell, do you have additional questions that you wish to ask?

Senator PELL. I do, and they would take about 5 minutes.

Senator LUGAR. What is your pleasure? Would you wish to proceed now or should the Chair recognize the Senator from Maryland?

Senator SARBANES. I will yield to Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Why does the Senator not finish his questioning. That would be quite all right with me.

Senator LUGAR. Very well. Senator Sarbanes, why do you not finish your questioning?

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

I want to put that question again, because I want to make sure I understand it. Are the American Marines in danger if the Lebanese Armed Forces are in danger?

Secretary SHULTZ. The stronger the Lebanese Armed Force is, the stronger we are in our effort to obtain our objectives in Lebanon. And I think it follows that the stronger the LAF is the better, the more assurance we have.

But we are not basing our return of fire on that proposition. Our self-defense proposition basically is that people who fire on us will find that fire returned. And in the case of Suq al-Gharb, which happens to overlook our positions, an ounce of preventive medicine there is worth an awful lot of cure in our opinion.

Senator SARBANES. I take it the answer, then, is in certain instances you would assert that our Marines are in danger if the Lebanese Armed Forces are in danger, even though our Marines at that particular time are themselves not under assault, is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. There can be cases in which a certain position——

Senator SARBANES. I do not quarrel with that position. In fact, I think it would make some sense. I am just trying to clarify what the range of this authorization is. I take it it is your view that in some instances——

General KELLEY. Sir, if I may. This was done on the basis of a military judgment, an absolutely unequivocally military judgment and a recommendation by the military leaders of this country, that that piece of terrain, that dominant terrain, is critical to the defense of the marines.

Senator SARBANES. But that is an instance in which the judgment was made that the Lebanese Armed Forces were in danger and that was a danger to the American Marines?

General KELLEY. The judgment was made, if Suq al-Gharb is lost to a hostile force or a force potentially hostile to the marines, it would endanger the marines. We can twist that one around all day long.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Secretary, do you envision an American involvement in Lebanon apart from the Multinational Force?

Secretary SHULTZ. Well, we have a flow of aid to Lebanon. We have positioned ourselves to stand ready to help them in their reconstruction efforts. So we have a variety of things going, potentially, if foreign forces can be removed from Lebanon and the process of reconstruction can start.

So yes, I think that there is a potential American involvement, which we have discussed from time to time and which is represented in some of the appropriations.

Senator SARBANES. Do you envision an American military role apart from the Multinational Force?

Secretary SHULTZ. No, I do not, except that—well, let me just be careful here. We have had people in Lebanon training the Lebanese Armed Forces. I cannot recall off the top of my head, maybe General Kelley can, how many people have been involved in doing that. But we have tried to help with the training of that armed force.

It is conceivable that if what we wish to have happen starts to happen, namely agreements for foreign forces to withdraw and the LAF undertakes to move around the country and help assure stability, that units of the Multinational Force and units of UNIFIL will be asked to undertake different missions than the ones that now are held. In that case, we have said that we would consider that.

Senator SARBANES. Well, do you read the congressional authorization being provided here for American military involvement in Lebanon as being limited to their involvement in the context of the Multinational Force?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes.

Senator SARBANES. Do you believe that the President has authority under the constitutional assertions which you are making to involve our military there outside of the context of the Multinational Force?

Secretary SHULTZ. I believe the President, as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, has a measure of authority to deploy American military forces wherever, and that is part of his constitutional responsibility. Now, what he would intend to do in Lebanon

obviously is one of intense consultation with the Congress. I do not think any President wants to just go off on his own.

Senator SARBANES. I want to pursue just briefly the line of questioning that Senator Glenn pursued, because it seems to me that the mission which you are setting out here in the testimony has been significantly broadened over the mission contained in the exchange of notes at the end of September of 1982.

I take it in your statement the mission is defined on withdrawal of all external forces.

Secretary SHULTZ. As I tried to suggest to Senator Glenn, there is a distinction to be made between what our broad objectives are in Lebanon on the one hand and the mission technically of the Multinational Force on the other. The Multinational Force supports that mission, but the mission is broader and includes meetings that go well beyond the Multinational Force as such.

Senator SARBANES. Well, do you expect our troops to be there until all external forces have been withdrawn from Lebanon?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not want to set up some expectation about when our troops will leave Lebanon.

Senator SARBANES. What is your view of what constitutes a substantial expansion in the number or role in Lebanon of the U.S. Armed Forces?

Secretary SHULTZ. I do not have in my mind some number, plus or minus some number. But there is a scale that is consistent with the mission around the airport and the weaponry that goes with it and the infrastructure that is needed to support it, and that seems to call for something in the vicinity of 1,200 marines.

General KELLEY. 1,200 to 1,600 marines.

Secretary SHULTZ. General Kelley says 1,200 to 1,600 marines. That is kind of the range.

Senator SARBANES. So you would not view an increase of the 1,200 marines that is there now to 1,600 as being a substantial expansion?

Secretary SHULTZ. I think in terms of the mission and what it takes to perform it.

General KELLEY. In point of fact, what we are talking about, Senator Sarbanes, are the support people. All of the rifle companies, the combat units, are indeed ashore. We rotate support people in and out. So any given day we have a different number, depending on what support element may be ashore.

The number has run a little over—1,200 was a magic number that somehow was used. But it has been running closer to, in fact, on a day-to-day basis, closer to 1,500 or 1,600. The only people who are aboard ship—what we have, just to put it in perspective, a marine amphibious unit is there. A marine amphibious unit has 1,800 to 2,000 people nominally. What we have now aboard ship are just those people who are maintaining the helicopters and doing some of those support functions. So the rest have been ashore the majority of the time.

Senator SARBANES. Who, heretofore, controlled the Chouf Mountains in the interfactional fighting in Lebanon? Historically, who was in control of that area?

Secretary SHULTZ. Historically, different confessional groups shared power and held different towns or communities through different parts of that area.

Senator SARBANES. And who held the authority in the Chouf?

Secretary SHULTZ. Let me ask my assistant to step up here. He is an expert on all of this.

This is Mr. Pelletreau, our NEA Deputy Assistant Secretary.

Mr. PELLETREAU. Historically, Senator, the actual authority in the Chouf has been divided between Druze villages and communities and Christian villages and communities. But since 1943 and the national charter, this has all been under the national Lebanese Government.

Senator SARBANES. Now, it is asserted that Jumblatt went back on an agreement reached. Is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. I have not asserted that.

Senator SARBANES. I will rephrase the question. It has been stated in the press that he went back on an agreement reached with respect, I take it, to the internal negotiations in Lebanon on the extent of the Government, is that correct?

Secretary SHULTZ. There is a heavy flow of negotiations and positions being taken and so on, and he has been part of that process. But I have been wanting very much to refrain from detailed discussion on who has taken what position and the extent to which they have changed their minds and so on.

Senator SARBANES. All right, I accept that.

We had some questions which Senator Byrd wanted to put to you, Mr. Secretary. The French Foreign Minister warned against dividing the Middle East into Russian-Syrian, and American-Israeli spheres of influence. Are the French in effect implying that the original reason for the presence of the multinational force in Lebanon has changed?

Secretary SHULTZ. I know that the French Foreign Minister made a statement along the lines of placing the French not in, as he described it, the United States-Israeli camp or the Soviet-Syrian camp. I think that is a very artificial way of thinking of the situation and I do not accept it.

Senator SARBANES. I am quoting now from the New York Times. It said:

> Speaking on Monday in a television interview in Paris, he criticized the United States naval bombardment of Druze and Syrian positions in the hills beyond Beirut and then warned about this.

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, I think there is a difference of view in fact about who was in those positions. Our evidence is that increasingly in fact—and increasingly we get evidence that there is a very heavy overlay of non-Lebanese forces involved in the fighting in that area. And I believe that if the French Foreign Minister were here, he would acknowledge that that does make a difference.

Senator SARBANES. The other two questions I have here that Senator Byrd wanted put are these: Quite bluntly, if the French pull out their troops before the expiration of the 18-month period in the administration's proposal, would the United States do likewise? Would the original justification of participating in a multilateral peacekeeping force in Lebanon have been overtaken by events?

Secretary SHULTZ. We will continue to maintain the pattern of consultation and collaboration with other members of the MNF, and we just have to see what comes out of that consultative process as we go along. So far it has worked very well.

I think each country feels that before it takes any action it will consult with others and hear their views. That is the process that we would expect to continue.

I might say that this resolution did not originate as a request from the administration. It arose out of congressional concern about the War Powers Act and emerged from a negotiation. It is not as though the administration has come in and has laid a request on you.

But at this point in time, given all the discussion, I certainly feel that a vote by the Congress on it is essential.

Senator SARBANES. Senator Byrd's final question that I have is, Why have we not explored more aggressively either expanding the Multinational Force or having an expanded U.N. peacekeeping force deployed in Lebanon?

Secretary SHULTZ. We have worked hard to maintain the U.S. peacekeeping force, UNIFIL, and supported the continuing of the resolution that permits that to happen in the United Nations. The question of its mandate comes up with each point in time when the resolution is renewed, and it has not been felt advisable to try to do anything about that until the situation in Lebanon clarifies itself.

In the meantime, of course, it is a struggle to keep the countries in the UNIFIL force engaged. And I give them a great deal of credit for staying with it. So we have been aggressive in trying to keep that together. That has, of course, a Soviet potential veto connected with it.

As far as the MNF is concerned and its size, we think the MNF was sized originally for the mission that it is undertaking, and the mission has not changed. It remains the same. If the situation in Lebanon should change so that we see foreign forces leaving and the kind of result that we are seeking emerging, we have said we are willing to consider additional missions for the MNF. But we have not committed ourselves to undertaking, but to consider them. And once they are proposed we would intend to consult with you about it.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I do not think Senator Byrd is talking about expanding the number or the mission of the Multinational Force, but expanding the parties participating in the Multinational Force, given the current overall numbers and the current mission. In other words, have we made any efforts to involve other countries in the Multinational Force?

Secretary SHULTZ. Yes, we have.

Senator SARBANES. Without success?

Secretary SHULTZ. It is conceivable that some other countries might come in at an appropriate further time. But I do not think there is any likelihood of somebody coming in right next week, in this current kind of situation.

Senator SARBANES. Thank you.

Thank you. Mr. Chairman.

Senator LUGAR. Thank you, Senator Sarbanes.

Senator Pell.

Senator PELL. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

There is one other point of information that I wanted to get for the minority leader, and that is: Does the policy for Lebanon still rest on the pillar of the Multinational Peacekeeping Force as it is presently constituted? Do you see any change in this force?

Secretary SHULTZ. The Multinational Peacekeeping Force is an important pillar, but it is not the pillar. It is part of a situation which we are trying to construct, and we think it has an important role to play. But it is not the main driving force in the whole situation.

However, in the imagery of pillars or legs on chairs and so forth, if you pull one out it tends to disrupt the whole structure.

Senator PELL. Thank you very much. Let the record show that the questions Senator Byrd wanted asked have all been asked, so we will not submit any for the record.

I do submit for the record, however, some questions that are being submitted by the junior Senator from Connecticut, Mr. Dodd. We ask that those be answered for the record.

Senator LUGAR. Without objection, it is so ordered.

I have one further point of business that concerns all of us. The chairman and the ranking member have cleared this unanimous consent request which I now pose. I move that the committee convene at 9 a.m. on Friday, September 23, in this room to begin debate on pending resolutions relating to Lebanon and the War Powers Resolution.

At 12 noon on Friday, the committee will vote on a motion to order reported one joint resolution of specific authorization and such other resolutions as the committee may decide and vote to have reported at that time. Such joint resolution of specific authorization shall be reported and filed, together with a report containing the recommendations of the committee, at the convening of the Senate on Monday, September 26, when in accordance with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, it shall become the pending business of the Senate.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, could you read that again? We went through that the other day on the freeze resolution.

Senator LUGAR. Yes, all right, I will read the motion again. I move that the committee convene at 9 a.m. on Friday—the witnesses, let me say, may be excused, unless you want to find out how this is going to come out, and it occurs to me that you might.

Secretary SHULTZ. It is fascinating. I would love to find out. But I think I will go. I have been testifying since 10 o'clock this morning.

Senator LUGAR. There is a reasonable request. Thank you very much.

I will now repeat the motion. I move that the committee convene at 9 a.m. on Friday, September 23, in this room to begin debate on pending resolutions relating to Lebanon and the War Powers Resolution.

At 12 noon on Friday, the committee will vote on a motion to order reported one joint resolution of specific authorization and such other resolutions as the committee may decide and vote to have reported at that time. Such joint resolution of specific authorization shall be reported and filed, together with a report containing the recommendations of the committee, at the convening of the

Senate on Monday, September 26, when, in accordance with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution, it shall become the pending business in the Senate.

Senator SARBANES. I have no objection to the markup on Friday and I think it ought to proceed to conclusion. But I really do not follow the language, and I must say, after what happened the other day, I really think this committee has to start following the regular order.

This is in a sense unrelated to this issue. I do not think the members want to give away any of the orderly procedure of the committee.

Senator LUGAR. That is a point well taken. But the reason for filing this specific report is to clear up any confusion with regard to when the motion would be taken up on the floor of the Senate. The contingency arose after the discussion early this afternoon that markup leading to conclusion could lead to action on the Senate floor that very afternoon, on Friday.

It was the general feeling of Members that Monday ought to be the day on which we commence the debate on the War Powers Act. And so the only change, as I recall, from the conversation we have had earlier on today is to clarify when the debate would commence, so that the Members could be warned.

Senator PELL. And there would be no votes on Monday. Votes would be rolled over until Tuesday.

Senator LUGAR. That was our understanding.

Senator SARBANES. I understand that a procedure was locked in earlier. I was not present for that. Is that correct?

Senator LUGAR. An understanding occurred that we would have markup at 9 a.m. on Friday.

Senator SARBANES. No, I gather a sequence of voting and so forth and so on.

Senator LUGAR. This would not disturb the sequence of voting.

Mr. TIPSON [general counsel]. He proposed to do Mathias, Byrd, and Baker in order, and then to have the final vote at 12 noon. So we are not prejudging what order we take them up in. That is what we are doing. The amendments can be offered. We are just trying to free up that original consent request.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I object. The consent request having been made, I would have objected to that consent request.

This has nothing to do with this issue, but you know, we went through this the other day and I think the procedures of the committee were abused, and I think that has to stop.

Senator PELL. Excuse me. I would add that we had a meeting of the committee earlier in the back room and we discussed this general time frame. I checked with the members who were there, I checked with your representative, as to whether the timing would be agreeable.

Senator SARBANES. The question that was put to me was, was I agreeable to markup up at 9 a.m. on Friday. My answer to that is yes, certainly. I think we should move on this. I think we should mark it up on Friday.

But that is not what now I understand is being put forward. The whole procedures are being set out through unanimous consent, just as happened the other day on the nuclear freeze resolutions.

Senator PELL. The only addition, as I understand it—well, not addition—but we agreed at the time that we would vote and prepare a time certain so that members could make plans to travel. So we agreed to the vote time certain, that it would be noon on Friday. And then the question came up——

Senator SARBANES. Well, there is a procedure locked into place, as I understand it, from a unanimous consent earlier on.

Senator LUGAR. There is not, really. The Chair would rule there was no unanimous consent at all.

Senator SARBANES. I was just told it was obtained earlier.

Senator LUGAR. We had an informal conference, as the ranking member pointed out, behind the scenes for the accommodation of members. The point of attempting to make a formal resolution—no request was put before this committee.

Senator PELL. There was no formal request. We just sat around at a meeting.

Senator SARBANES. But that is not what I was just told.

Mr. TIPSON. There is some confusion and we do not have a transcript. My recollection is, Senator Percy said, we will vote on the resolutions in order and have a final vote at 12 o'clock, and then everyone got confused as to whether that was actually put forward or not.

What we are trying to do here is undo the locking-in of that procedure.

Senator SARBANES. Well, I think the procedure should be worked out on Friday morning.

Senator PELL. All right, but with the understanding that we vote at 12 o'clock.

Senator SARBANES. I have no objections to voting at 12 o'clock, but I am not quite sure what it is we are going to be voting on.

Senator PELL. Frankly, I think we could do better without the motion.

Senator LUGAR. All right, then. Let us, among the three of us, since we are the survivors of this meeting, agree that we will have the markup at 9 a.m., that we will have votes at 12 on any resolutions that come before us, and that there is no order.

Senator PELL. And there will be no votes on Monday, although willy-nilly——

Senator SARBANES. Oh, no, I do not agree to that. I want to find out whether unanimous consent has in fact been made and given. If it in fact has been made and given, then I want to be able to judge whether I want to adhere to that unanimous consent or to vitiate it, that having now been done.

Senator LUGAR. Let me answer the question of the Senator from Maryland. There is no unanimous consent, because I object to whatever has occurred.

Senator SARBANES. It has already happened?

Senator LUGAR. No, there has not been before this committee in formal session any resolution asking.

Senator SARBANES. That is what I was asking.

Senator LUGAR. That is what I am asking for now. Since we have not had one before and you object to this one, we have nothing.

Senator SARBANES. Mr. Chairman, my understanding is that there is a view—and we need to check the transcript——

Senator LUGAR. Well, a view is different from a unanimous consent request.

Senator SARBANES. But we need to check the transcript as to whether a unanimous consent request was in fact sought and given, and that a subsequent unanimous consent request that you are now seeking would be to unlock the procedure put into place by the prior unanimous consent.

It is my position that I object to this request. I think we should see whether in fact a unanimous consent request was given, and if it was given then on Friday we should decide whether we want to stick with that procedure or depart from it.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I would take the view that there was no request placed.

Senator SARBANES. That is why I want to have the transcript checked.

Senator LUGAR. Well, I am not talking about an informal session back in the barn. I am talking about formal sessions, precisely of the sort we are having here. You have every right to object to this, but I would contend that we have no working agreement, and that is why we maybe need to work out one presently.

Senator PELL. I do not know that the whole thing was as formal as this, because what I understood when we came to the front room was, Senator Percy said—he more or less announced that this was the schedule which had been agreed to in the general conversation.

Senator SARBANES. If the unanimous consent request was not put formally on the prior agreement, then Senator Lugar is correct, there is no agreement then. If it was put and granted, then I assume it would be on the transcript and we will then see that. And if it is, that is in place.

This request to unlock it I object to, because I want to ascertain whether it is in place and then make the judgment as to whether that procedure ought to be unlocked. That is my position, put very simply. I think it is a very reasonable one.

Senator LUGAR. I would hope the Senator from Maryland would understand that my position has some reason to it likewise. I doubt whether decisions made in a back room trying to accommodate members are valid unless they are put in formal session.

Senator SARBANES. I do not argue that a decision was made in the back room. What I am raising is that, as I understand it, a statement was made in the front room and therefore would appear on the transcript.

Senator LUGAR. This would be a formal statement, if adopted.

Senator SARBANES. No, the prior one.

Senator LUGAR. I do not recall that Senator Percy put such a statement forward.

Senator PELL. It was my recollection that there was an announcement, but not a formal statement.

Senator SARBANES. Well, that is the same thing we had the other day. When we reread the announcement it had "without objection" in it at the outset. I think the other day we thought an announcement had been put and it turned out not to be an announcement, but a unanious consent request. That is what happens.

Senator PELL. Well, the transcript will show it.

Senator SARBANES. Yes, that is right, hopefully.

Senator LUGAR. Very well. This hearing is adjourned.

[Whereupon, at 5:35 p.m., the committee adjourned, subject to the call of the Chair.]

○